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The global spread of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome highlighted the need to detect and control 
disease outbreaks at their source, as envisioned by the 
2005 revised International Health Regulations (IHR). June 
2012 marked the initial deadline by which all 194 World 
Health Organization (WHO) member states agreed to have 
IHR core capacities fully implemented for limiting the spread 
of public health emergencies of international concern. 
Many countries fell short of these implementation goals 
and requested a 2-year extension. The degree to which 
achieving IHR compliance will result in global health security 
is not clear, but what is clear is that progress against the 
threat of epidemic disease requires a focused approach that 
can be monitored and measured efﬁ  ciently. We developed 
concrete goals and metrics for 4 of the 8 core capacities 
with other US government partners in consultation with 
WHO and national collaborators worldwide. The intent is 
to offer an example of an approach to implementing and 
monitoring IHR for consideration or adaptation by countries 
that complements other frameworks and goals of IHR. 
Without concrete metrics, IHR may waste its considerable 
promise as an instrument for global health security against 
public health emergencies.
T
he global spread of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome highlighted the need to detect and control 
disease outbreaks at their source (1,2). The 2005 revised 
International Health Regulations (IHR) were established 
as a legally binding agreement providing a framework 
for improving detection, reporting, and response to public 
health emergencies of international concern (public health 
emergencies) (3). The global implementation of IHR began 
on June 15, 2007, and in an unusual episode of international 
consensus, all 194 WHO member states ratiﬁ  ed  the 
agreement. When implemented, IHR should improve 
global capacity to detect, assess, notify, and respond to 
public health threats. Properly and fully implemented, 
IHR should usher in a new global era of international 
communication, cooperation, and unprecedented security 
against the epidemic threats that have plagued humanity 
since ancient times. But there is a problem.
After enactment of the revised IHR in June 2007, all 
member countries were required to develop and implement 
a minimum of core public health capacities by June 2012, 
the 5-year anniversary of IHR’s enforcement. Many 
countries did not meet the deadline and have requested a 
2-year extension. In an era of limited resources, competing 
priorities, and political challenges, achievement of the IHR 
implementation goals, even with an extension, will be a 
challenge. Focusing efforts toward IHR implementation 
and capacity building and enabling all countries to measure 
progress toward IHR implementation is, therefore, essential. 
Toward this end, concrete goals and metrics for 4 of the 8 
core capacities were developed by the WHO Collaborating 
Center for IHR Implementation of National Surveillance 
and Response Capacity at the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention with other US government partners 
in consultation with WHO and national collaborators 
worldwide (Table 1). This approach is in alignment with 
WHO’s IHR framework and facilitates measurement of 
implementation activities. The framework focuses on 4 
of the core capacities (human resources, surveillance, 
laboratory, and response) and builds on WHO’s IHR 
Monitoring Framework by deﬁ  ning simple standards for 
these capacities (4). The focus on these 4 capacities should 
not imply that they are more important than other capacities 
(legislation, policy, and ﬁ  nancing; coordination; advocacy 
and national focal point communications; preparedness; 
and risk communication) because implementation of IHR 
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requires implementation of all 8 capacities. The intent 
is to assist partner countries in better focusing efforts, to 
improving efﬁ  ciency at IHR implementation, and to better 
monitoring and evaluating progress. Focusing on the subset 
of IHR core capacities also will provide a foundation for 
an all-hazards approach for addressing public health 
emergencies regardless of cause. We describe the rationale, 
targets, and deﬁ  nitions for these 4 goals and means by which 
countries can use the data collected through monitoring 
and evaluation indicators for measuring progress related to 
these 4 core capacities.
Human Resources
A well-trained cadre of public health professionals at 
the national health authorities at a country’s central and 
local levels is needed for timely detection and response to 
public health emergencies. There is a worldwide shortage 
of public health professionals who are trained in public 
health practice and have had competency-based public 
health ﬁ  eld experience. Building the cadre of ﬁ  eld-trained 
epidemiologists available to monitor disease trends, inform 
decision makers about potential disease threats, and guide 
response during a public health emergency should be one 
of the ﬁ  rst priorities in implementing the IHR.
The aim of the human resource goal is to ensure 
adequate numbers of trained personnel for response to 
a public health emergency. Speciﬁ   c targets to measure 
progress toward completion of this goal are a fully adopted 
national workforce plan and >1 trained ﬁ  eld epidemiologist 
per 200,000 population who are active in the public health 
sector (5). Although the workforce plan cannot ensure 
that trained professionals remain in the public health 
sector, it will at least indicate a government’s commitment 
to public health through stability of the public health 
workforce. These concrete indicators enable measurement 
of incremental progress and are speciﬁ  c enough to enable 
tracking of success and clear documentation of failure.
Surveillance
Disease surveillance is a cornerstone of public health 
practice. It provides for systematic and ongoing collection of 
data that help identify and detect disease-related aberrations 
that might constitute public health emergencies. Additionally, 
surveillance for key disease syndromes provides the 
foundation for interpreting signals of possible emergencies 
and early notiﬁ  cation of outbreaks of potentially devastating 
diseases (6). The following 5 syndromes have internationally 
recognized standards for syndromic surveillance: severe 
acute respiratory syndrome, acute neurologic syndrome, 
acute hemorrhagic fever, acute watery diarrhea with 
dehydration, and jaundice with fever (7,8).
The metrics focus on the ability to detect public health 
emergencies with a target of documenting that >3 of these 
syndromes have surveillance systems in place that meet the 
respective international standards. These metrics will assist 
countries in ensuring that efforts at disease surveillance 
are effective and that systemic incentives are appropriately 
aligned to provide early warning for a potential public 
health emergency. The 3 syndromes chosen will depend 
on national disease control priorities. These surveillance 
systems should include early warning surveillance data and 
laboratory ﬁ  ndings, which should be analyzed by trained 
epidemiologists.
Information for syndromic surveillance collected at 
the clinic or hospital level can help generate village- and 
district-level alerts. An alert investigation unit can then 
investigate these alerts, including an in-depth epidemiologic 
analysis. On the basis of the outcome of the analysis, rapid 
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Table 1. Goals, targets, and intended use for 4 core capacities for focusing International Health Regulations implementation 
Capacity Goal  Target/measure  Intended  use 
Human resources  Ensure adequate numbers of 
trained personnel are available 
to support the response to a 
public health emergency 
A national workforce plan and 1 
trained field epidemiologist for 
every 200,000 persons 
Document that a workforce plan exists 
and is maintained and updated, and 
monitor annual progress toward the goal 
of 1 trained field epidemiologist for every 
200,000 persons. 
Surveillance  Ensure that surveillance 
systems capable of detecting 
selected potential public health 
emergencies in any part of the 
country are established and 
functioning
Surveillance infrastructure that 
demonstrates the ability to detect 
>3 of 5 syndromes indicative of a 
potential public health emergency 
of international concern 
Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the surveillance system, and identify 
areas for improvement within the country’s 
public health surveillance infrastructure. 
Laboratory  Ensure access to laboratory 
diagnostic capabilities that can 
identify a range of emerging 
epidemic pathogens by using 
the full spectrum of basic 
laboratory testing methods 
Ability to perform 10 core 
diagnostic tests for confirmation 
of indicator pathogens from any 
part of the country 
Assess/measure capacity for detection will 
by using external/internal quality 
assurance for each of the 10 core tests 
and indicator pathogens using standard 
methods.
Response  Ensure countries have 
adequate rapid response 
capacity for public health 
emergencies
At least 1 functioning rapid 
response team per major 
administrative unit 
Maintain an adequate number of rapid 
response teams with the necessary 
training, appropriate personnel, and 
regular outbreak responses. PERSPECTIVE
response teams can be deployed to respond to a public 
health event or outbreak.
Laboratory
Laboratory diagnostic capacity can help in detecting 
emerging or reemerging pathogens in a timely manner 
and can support syndromic surveillance systems by 
adding speciﬁ   city. Given the costs associated with 
establishing laboratory diagnostic capacity, diagnostic 
capability might not be feasible for all pathogens for 
every country. Therefore, pooling international laboratory 
resources through networks of local, national, regional, 
and international reference laboratories is encouraged. 
However, countries should be able to provide certain 
core diagnostic tests (either through their own or through 
network capacity) quickly and reliably to direct disease 
surveillance and response activities.
The metrics focus on the ability to perform 10 
international reference standard tests for patients from 
any part of the country. The core tests and their respective 
indicator pathogens are selected from the IHR immediately 
notiﬁ  able list, the WHO Top Ten Causes of Death in low-
income countries (www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/
fs310/en/index.html), and tests and indicator pathogens 
selected by the country on the basis of major national 
public health concern (Table 2).
However, achievement of laboratory diagnostic 
capacity requires all major components of the laboratory 
network to be well integrated in the national laboratory 
system. Components of such a system include sample 
collection, specimen transport, specimen processing, 
quality management systems, biosafety and biosecurity 
(specimen storage), staff, infrastructure, cold chains, 
reporting, and networking peripheral and central or regional 
reference laboratories. Data on the capacity and ability of 
the country to perform and report the 10 core tests can be 
used to monitor the ability of a country’s own laboratories 
or the reference laboratories to which it sends specimens 
to conﬁ  rm and characterize these indicator pathogens and 
identify areas for improvement.
Response
To implement IHR 2005, countries must have adequate 
rapid response capacity. During a public health emergency, 
timely response to public health events and threats is 
essential to prevent excess illness and death and control 
further transmission, including transborder spread. The 
presence of well-trained and functioning rapid response 
teams at local and national levels in a country can ensure 
a rapid, well-coordinated, and organized public health 
response.
These rapid response units should comprise 
a multidisciplinary team of trained public health 
professionals—medical epidemiologists, veterinarians, 
laboratory scientists, clinicians, chemical experts, and 
radiologic experts—as appropriate for the event who 
routinely deploy within 24 hours after a reported event. 
Rapid response units enhance a country’s ability to respond 
to outbreaks in a timely and effective manner.
These teams should undergo regular exercises for 
responding to public health emergency events, including 
>2 ﬁ  eld outbreak investigations per year. They also should 
be trained in the 10 basic steps for outbreak investigations 
(10).
To meet the goal of adequate response capacity for 
public health emergencies, we propose a target of >1 
functioning rapid response team per major administrative 
unit (district, province, or state). Larger administrative 
areas might need >1 team. Data and after-action reports 
from outbreak responses collected annually will enable 
the countries to monitor their progress, identify gaps, and 
improve performance.
Conclusions
Implementation of IHR, required of all WHO member 
states, was not completed by the June 2012 deadline. The 
aim is for all countries to develop or enhance the ability 
to detect and respond to public health emergencies. 
Additionally, possible public health emergencies of 
international concern also need to be reported to prevent the 
spread of disease around the globe. Countries need concrete 
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Table 2. Core laboratory tests and indicator pathogens in the International Health Regulations 
Core test  Indicator pathogen  Turnaround time from receipt in the laboratory 
PCR  Influenza virus*  Within 24 h 
Virus culture  Poliovirus*  Within 14 d 
Serology  HIV†  Within 5 d 
Microscopy  Mycobacterium tuberculosis† Within 3 d 
Rapid diagnostic test  Plasmodium spp.†  Within 2 h 
Bacterial culture  Salmonella enteritidis serotype Typhi‡  Within 3 d 
Local priority test  Local priority test§  Local priority test 
Local priority test  Local priority test§  Local priority test 
Local priority test  Local priority test§  Local priority test 
Local priority test  Local priority test§  Local priority test 
*Selected from the International Health Regulations immediately notifiable list. 
†Selected from WHO Top Ten Causes of Death in low-income countries (www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/index.html).  
‡Selected from WHO Global Foodborne Infections Network (www.who.int/gfn/en). 
§Indicator pathogens selected by the country on the basis of major national public health concern. International Health Regulations
and well-deﬁ   ned goals and indicators to monitor their 
progress toward implementation of IHR core capacities. 
Even though we described metrics for 4 of the 8 IHR 
core capacities, we emphasize that full IHR compliance 
requires implementation of all 8 capacities. Goals and 
progress indicators also might be useful for the other 4 
capacities. Without explicit goals and targets, the promise 
of international consensus around IHR might be wasted, 
but with them there is hope that what gets measured will 
eventually get done.
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